First, they are both for twelve day periods. That’s because they cover the two-week annual training periods required of all reservists. In my professional judgment, they are not credible indicators of actual performance as an intelligence analyst or officer. A more realistic indicator of Naval officer performance would be his annual fitness report from his reserve unit commanding officer. We don’t see those, do we? I didn’t know the guy personally, though I’m pretty sure I encountered him at several points over the years. He thought better of himself than his peers did, trust me.

Second, if you look at Blocks 51 (Evaluation) and 52 (Summary), you’ll see that while he is evaluated as “high,” in the summary you’ll see the number “1.” That’s the number of officers evaluated in that particular cycle. Naval Officers are evaluated against their peers. In most naval units and ships, you’d normally see a number larger than one in Block 52. The placement of the “X” in 51 compared to the number in Block 52 will show you where a Naval Officer breaks out in his Commanding Officer’s opinion. Sheafer and McConnell gave Mitchie what we in the Navy call a “one of one” fitness report. Those reports are usually ignored by Naval Officer Selection Boards for promotion purposes.

Naval Reserve officers who came on board active duty commands for two-week annual training periods usually got this very same (or very similar) fitrep, year in, year out as long as they managed to stay out of trouble and not set the place on fire. This sort of inflated fitness report is also a major reason why the Naval Officer Fitness Report system was overhauled a few years later (didn’t work out very well, but that’s a different story). With everyone a superlative water-walker, it was hard to separate the wheat from the chaff and I saw way too much chaff promote up during the 1990′s.

When I read his write-ups (the textual portion on page 2), it appeared to me he didn’t really do all that much during those two training periods. Morocco and Somalia weren’t all that “hot” in July, 1989 (Somalia was not too much later, though). By Dec, 1990 the Pentagon wasn’t “the” place to be for an aspiring junior officer. This was during the final phase of Operation Desert Shield, the buildup to Desert Storm, the first Iraq War, which kicked off the next month. Guys really looking to promote up were out in the fleet or elsewhere in the Middle East, most typically Saudi Arabia. Mitchie-boy was in the rear with the beer. Myself, I was more than happy to be at a small Naval facility in the Great Dismal Swamp on the Virginia-North Carolina state line at the time.

I guess what I really wonder is didn’t he think someone out here wouldn’t recognize his fitreps for what they are? They’re simply attestations that he spent some time at a particular command on annual training and managed not to incur the wrath of the Chain of Command.

How do I know all this? I was in the Navy from 1973 to 2006, both as an enlisted sailor and as an officer. Not so long after Wade’s visitation there, I also served at that very same JCS/J2, only for two years, not two two-week training periods. I’ve seen more than a few Mitch Wades in my time.

ps – Patty K, you’re absolutely right.