Monthly Archive for December, 2009

Former SD imam has “gone operational”

December 30, 2009, by Seth Hettena. 0 Comments

Lots of heat on Awlaki now, probably coming out the House Intelligence Committee:

The radical Yemeni-based cleric connected to two violent plots in the U.S. has “gone operational,” a senior U.S. official told Fox News.

The Nigerian accused of trying to blow up a Detroit-bound airliner had his suicide mission personally blessed in Yemen by Anwar al-Awlaki, the same Muslim imam suspected of radicalizing the Fort Hood shooting suspect, a U.S. intelligence source has told The Washington Times. 

“It appears that just like with Major Hasan, Awlaki played a role in this,” said Rep. Pete Hoekstra, R-Mich, ranking minority member of the House Intelligence Committee tells ABC News.

Mitch Wade lawyer nominated for US Atty

December 29, 2009, by Seth Hettena. 0 Comments

President Obama has nominated Ronald C. Machen Jr. to be U.S. Attorney in Washington DC.

Machen, 40, was part of the team at WilmerHale that defended defense contractor Mitchell Wade, briber of Randy “Duke” Cunningham.

Thanks to WilmerHale’s efforts, Wade is serving a 30-month sentence. That’s not bad, considering that Cunningham is serving more than eight years and Wade’s former boss and Cunningham briber, Brent Wilkes, is appealing his 12 year sentence.

Machen also represented another corrupt former congressman, Democrat William Jefferson and Christopher Ward, former National Republican Campaign Committee treasurer accused of stealing funds.

The U.S. Attorney is DC’s top law enforcement official, overseeing  the largest federal prosecutors office in the country.

Machen served as an Assistant US Attorney in the Office of the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, US Department of Justice, from 1997 to 2001.

A “technical error”

December 29, 2009, by Seth Hettena. 0 Comments

“And the mujahideen brothers in the Manufacturing Sector possessed a highly advanced device, with Allah’s grace, and it was tested and proved to be successful and practical, and it passed the inspection machines. Brother Omar has reached his target, with Allah’s grace, but, fate from Allah, a technical error happened and led to an incomplete detonation, and we will continue the path, Allah-permitting, until we reach what we want, and make faith all due to Allah.”

Poor tradecraft is, fortunately, a persistent problem for the jihadis as Michael Kenney notes in Organizational Learning and Islamic Militancy (May 2009), a study written for the U.S. Department of Justice. (.pdf)

“Indeed, mistakes and poor tradecraft are common in terrorist operations.  One of the most significant findings to emerge from this research regards Islamic terrorists’ propensity towards the poor tradecraft and operational errors.  In the cases examined in this study operatives committed a range of basic mistakes.  Militants forgot code words and aliases, resulting in miscommunication with their colleagues.  They foolishly tried to  run away from law enforcement officers or became visibly upset when questioned.  They received speeding tickets and other traffic citations when operating undercover in “enemy territory.  They provided incriminating hints of their looming attacks to people outside their conspiracies.  They took advanced aviation classes and expressed their desire to only learn how to steer, not land, large commercial aircraft.  They traveled together, not separately, when assembling for attacks.  They dressed and acted in ways that made them stand out more, not less.  They used matches instead of lighters to ignite bomb fuses.  They didn’t change their cell phones and SIM cards, even when under immense counter-terrorism pressure.  The list goes on.”

According to Kenney, what explains this is:

  1. Experience in guerrilla warfare does not translate particularly well to urban terrorism
  2. It is difficult to gain experience when the attack gets you killed.
  3. The war on terror hampers training and planning.
  4. Ideological or religious “certitude” that they don’t need to be careful because their fate is already determined by Allah

Super Yacht Attessa in San Diego

December 28, 2009, by Seth Hettena. 0 Comments

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This is Dennis Washington’s super yacht, the 225-foot Attessa III.

Found it docked today behind the San Diego Convention Center and got curious about the owner.

Forbes estimates Washington’s fortune at $4.2 billion, most of it held in Montana Rail Link railroad, Montana Resources copper and molybdenum mine—and cash.

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His boat, the Attessa, comes with a crew of 15 and accomodates 10, according to Yachtspecs. It’s flying the flag of the Cayman Islands, said to be the world’s leading “super yacht” registry.

What is PETN?

December 27, 2009, by Seth Hettena. 0 Comments

The suspect in the attempted bombing of Northwest Flight 253 used a highly explosive substance called PETN, a law enforcement official told CBS News Saturday.

PETN (Pentaerythritol tetranitrate) is a high-grade explosive used for commercial and military purposes.

PETN, which usually is a white powder, can be ignited with a hammer blow and is often used by itself as a detonator.

Virtually odorless, it is very difficult to detect, making it the terrorist weapon of choice.

ABC News reports that the device involved more than 80 grams of PETN (about 3 ounces).

For reference, investigators suspect that 11 ounces of Semtex (mostly PETN) was used to bring down Pan Am103 in 1988.

Richard Reid, the “shoe bomber” who tried to bring down American Airlines Flight 63 on Dec. 22, 2001 had 8 or 10 ounces of easily-made triacetone triperoxide (TATP) and PETN (detonating cord).

Reid’s shoe was supposed to be detonated by a fuse, which failed to light, but an FBI-DHS report cited by Time magazine  notes that “TATP or HMTD may be placed in a tube or syringe body in contact with a bare bulb filament, such as that obtained from inside a Christmas tree light bulb, to produce an explosion. … Terrorists have used peroxide-based explosive both as a main charge (weighing in excess of 20 pounds) and improvised detonators.”

In the Flight 253 attack, PETN appears to have been used as a secondary explosive with the syringe apparently serving as primary.

Witnesses described the syringe as “smoking.” The Nigerian suspect accused in the attack was trying to ignite the PETN with some sort of hot liquid in the syringe.

Since PETN’s autoignition temperature is 190 degrees (far less than a match) and the suspect suffered burns exactly why the device didn’t explode is a bit of a mystery.

Anwar al-Awlaki Reported Killed in Airstrike

December 24, 2009, by Seth Hettena. 0 Comments

An airstrike in Yemen reportedly killed and “targeted” former San Diego imam Anwar al-Awlaki, the man who served as a “spiritual advisor” to 9/11 hijackers and praised Fort Hood shooter Maj. Nidal Hasan as a “hero.” Background: Al-Awlaki timeline.

UPDATE: Al Jazeera reports that Awlaki is alive.

SANAA (Reuters) – “Anwar al-Awlaki is suspected to be dead,” the official said of the cleric who was on the run in Yemen, where he was on the government’s most-wanted list of terrorist suspects.

Yemen Observer: “The house of the US Fort Hood shooter’s mentor, Sheikh Anwar al-Awlaki, was raided and demolished….

Fox News.com: U.S. officials believe radical cleric Anwar Awlaki was “probably” one of dozens of militants killed in the strike, a source confirmed to FOX News.

Embassy of Yemen: Today, Yemeni fighter jets launched an aerial assault at 4:30 AM, on a remote location in the province of Shabwa. The assault targeted a meeting of senior Al-Qaeda operatives, 403 miles south east of Sana’a, the capital of Yemen. Preliminary reports suggest that the strike targeted scores of Yemeni and foreign Al-Qaeda operatives. Nasser Al-Wuhayshi, the regional Al-Qaeda leader and his deputy, Saeed Al-Shihri, alongside Anwar Al-Awlaki were presumed to be at the site. Among those targeted was Mohammed Saleh Oumair who publicly spoke couple of days ago at a rally in the province of Abyan. Reports added that the purpose of the above mentioned meeting was to plan a retaliation operation after government forces raided their hideouts last week. Less than a week ago, Yemeni forces carried out simultaneous raids killing and detaining militants in an Al-Qaeda hideouts in the provinces of Abyan and Sana’a.

SANA’A, Dec. 24 (Saba) - Yemeni Air forces carried out early on Thursday an air strike in Rafdh area of al-Said districts in Shabwa governorate killing about 30 al-Qaeda suspects from Yemeni and foreign nationalities.

An official source in the Supreme Security Committee said that the strike targeted a hideout of al-Qaeda, in which the al-Qaeda members have been holding a meeting attended by the terrorists Nasir al-Whaishi and Said al-Shihri, Saudi national.

According to the source, al-Qaeda meeting was to plan implementing a number of terrorist operations against Yemeni and foreign interests, including important economic facilities.

AFP: “Saudis and Iranians at the Wadi Rafadh meeting were also among the dead,” said the source, without going into detail.

A second security source told AFP the raid had been launched after residents had tipped the authorities off about the meeting.

The New York Times says the early morning raids were carried out with “intelligence provided in part by the United States,” while AP reports that U.S. and Saudi intelligence provided help.

END

The reports follow an interview with Awlaki broadcast by Al-Jazeera. Awlaki said that Maj. Nidal Hasan contacted him in December 2007 asking whether killing American soldiers and officers was a “religiously legitimate act.”

Q: “So he asked you that question about a year before the operation was carried out?”

A: “Yes. And I wondered how the American security agencies, who claim to be able to read car license plate numbers from space, everywhere in the world, I wondered how [they did not reveal this].”

Awlaki provided copies of the e-mails to Al-Jazeera.

FBI Finger-Pointing over Anwar Awlaki

December 22, 2009, by Seth Hettena. 0 Comments

Intelligence sharing is a bit like a game of hot potato: If you get stuck with it, you’ll get burned.

FBI officials in San Diego recently caught just such a hot potato when they intercepted e-mails between Maj. Nidal Hasan, the accused Fort Hood shooter, and a radical former San Diego imam named Anwar al-Awlaki.

These intercepts are among the government’s biggest secrets. Yet, at the same time, it would be surprising if Hasan and Nidal didn’t know that their communications were likely to be intercepted.

Awlaki had been an FBI counter-terrorism target for years. As an imam in San Diego in 2000, Awlaki served as a “spiritual advisor” to three 9/11 hijackers.

The FBI has asked him numerous times about his contacts with the hijackers, including when agents visited him in 2007 in a Yemeni prison. The intercepts were made about a year after he got out of prison. Today, he is said to be hiding in Yemen.

As for Hasan, he was a psychiatrist in the military. His contacts with Awlaki were viewed as consistent with some research he was conducting as a psychiatric resident at the U.S. Army’s Walter Reed Medical Center. A 2007 slideshow he gave at Walter Reed was titled “The Koranic World View As It Relates to Muslims in the U.S. Military.”

As many as 20 e-mails between Hasan and Awlaki were intercepted by the San Diego Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) between December 2008 and May 2009. The communications were deemed “consistent with research being conducted by Major Hasan in his position as a psychiatrist at the Walter Reed Medical Center,” the FBI says.

After the shooting that killed 13 people, a blog post on Aulaki’s website praised Hasan as a “hero.”

The communications between Awlaki and Hasan were never shared with the Defense Department, even though a member of the Defense Criminal Investigative Service was on the multi-agency San Diego JTTF.

CIA Director William Webster is conducting a review to find out what happened. According to The Washington Post, Webster will have the authority to make recommendations about possible changes to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which governs the highly sensitive communications intercepts at issue.

Awlaki is particularly troublesome for investigators because he is a U.S. citizen, born in New Mexico in 1971. As a result of that circumstance, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act required the JTTF to apply for a court order of surveillance at the secret FISA court or a certification from the U.S. attorney general. Investigators were required to present evidence that Awlaki was “an agent of a foreign power, or an officer or employee of a foreign power.”

Al-Qaida qualifies as a foreign power, and Charles Allen, a former CIA official and US Undersecretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, declared last year that Awlaki was part of al-Qaida’s reach into the U.S. homeland.

So, they got a warrant. Great. What good is such intelligence if you don’t use it?

In Hasan’s case, an investigator and a supervisor concluded that Hasan was not involved in terrorist activities or planning.

Further dissemination of the information “was neither sought nor authorized.” In plain English, the JTTF FBI supervisor wouldn’t let the folks from the Defense Department on his task force tell their commanders about the e-mails.

Officials in San Diego told Voice of San Diego’s Kelly Thornton that their counterparts in Washington are to blame:

One federal source described the probe this way: “Webster is going to investigate the Fort Hood guy and al-Aulaqi and whether the FBI screwed up. They’re saying San Diego failed to communicate the e-mails — but San Diego pestered the shit out of them, sending e-mails multiple times. The Washington field office didn’t do anything on it.”

The Washington Post reported Dec. 1 that members of Congress have identified “at least two troubling e-mails” that were intercepted by the San Diego FBI but not shared with Washington.

In a tit-for-tat battle, Thornton’s anonymous San Diego sources responded by saying that everything was fully communicated to Washington, which had “computer access” to everything San Diego had.

The Voice of San Diego, however, leaves out crucial background found in reports by the 9/11 Commission and Congressional Joint Inquiry on 9/11:

In June 1999, the FBI in San Diego investigated Awlaki after learning that he may have been contacted by a man who bought a satellite phone bin Laden used in the 1990s.

During its investigation, FBI learned that Awlaki knew individuals from the Holy Land Foundation and others involved in raising money for the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas. Sources alleged that Awlaki had other extremist connections.

In early 2000, Awlaki was visited by a subject of a Los Angeles FBI investigation closely associated with Blind Sheikh [Omar Abdel] Rahman.

Around the time Awlaki was holding closed door meetings in San Diego with two of the hijackers, the FBI closed its investigation, stating “the imam … does not meet the criterion for [further] investigation.”

It wouldn’t be the first time that the FBI in San Diego misjudged Awlaki. Then again, no one bothered to tell the FBI in San Diego about two of the 9/11 hijackers whom the CIA had tracked from Bangkok to Los Angeles in 2000 until it was too late.

Two Mossad Operatives Institutionalized

December 21, 2009, by Seth Hettena. 0 Comments

One of the large mental health hospitals in Israel was recently surprised to receive a young, good-looking patient in a psychotic state who was accompanied by a personal security guard, Yedioth Ahronoth reported.

The doctors, who asked why the woman was accompanied by a guard, were shocked to learn that she was a Mossad agent and that the security guard was not assigned to her in order assure her safety or protect her life, but to ensure that she not reveal any state secrets in her shaky mental state.

The Mossad guard’s orders were clear: “It is forbidden that the organization’s secrets be passed on to those unauthorized to hear them.” The doctors, who are unaccustomed to the presence of a third party during their treatment sessions, were left with no choice but to acquiesce to their demands. In addition, the staff had to receive a security clearance before being allowed to work on her exceptional case.

To their complete amazement, another young woman, also accompanied by a secret agent charged with ensuring that the she not leak any state secrets, arrived at the institution just a short time later. The doctors learned that she, too, is a Mossad agent.

Experts said Saturday that the nature of the young women’s work was most likely the cause of their psychosis.

Anwar Al-Awlaki Timeline

December 16, 2009, by Seth Hettena. 0 Comments

Former CIA Director William Webster is taking  a close look at how the FBI handled its investigation of a radical imam named Anwar al-Awlaki who had several e-mail exchanges with the suspected Fort Hood shooter, Maj. Nidal Hasan.

April 1971: Anwar al-Awlaki born in Cruces, N.M. while father is on diplomatic posting.

1978: Leaves U.S. for Yemen.

Jan. 13, 1988: Issued U.S. passport.

June 5, 1990: Enters U.S. in Chicago with Yemeni passport with J-1 exchange visitor U.S. visa issued in Sana’a.

June 6, 1990: Applies for Social Security card. Claims he was born in Sana’a, Yemen.

June 8, 1990: SSN 521-77-7121 issued to Awlaki.

Aug. 21, 1991: Enters U.S. in Chicago.

1991: Attends Colorado State University on a scholarship from Yemen.

Jan. 29, 1992: Enters U.S. in New York City.

Nov. 18, 1993:  Applies for a U.S. passport in Fort Collins, Colo.

1994: Graduates from Colorado State with bachelor’s in civil engineering.

1996: Named imam of Masjid al-Rabat in San Diego.

1996: Busted for soliciting a prostitute in San Diego.

Time uncertain: Arrested by San Diego police “for hanging around a school.”  (9/11 Commission MFR FBI Agent #59)

1997: Busted again for soliciting a prostitute in San Diego.

1998 & 1999: Serves as vice president of Charitable Society for Social Welfare Inc., the U.S. branch of a Yemeni charity headed by Abdul Majeed al-Zindani. Federal prosecutors in a New York terrorism-financing case later describe the charity as “a front organization” that was “used to support al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.”

January 1999: Enrolls in San Diego State University master’s in educational leadership program. SDSU spokesman says the school does not have records showing Awlaki earned a degree.

June 1999: FBI investigates Awlaki after learning that he may have been contacted by Ziyad Khaleel, who bought a satellite phone bin Laden used in the 1990s.

1999-2000: During its investigation, FBI learns that Awlaki knows individuals from the Holy Land Foundation and others involved in raising money for the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas. Sources alleged that Aulaqi had other extremist connections. (9/11 Commission Report)

February 2000: Four calls between Awlaki and Omar al-Bayoumi, a Saudi who helped Al-Hamzi and Almihdhar find an apartment in San Diego. An FBI agent tells 9/11 Commission staff he is “98 percent sure” that the two hijackers were using al-Bayoumi’s phone at this time. (9/11 Commission MFR FBI Agent #63)

Early 2000: Visited by a subject of a Los Angeles FBI investigation closely associated with Blind Sheikh [Omar Abdel] Rahman. (Congressional Joint Inquiry on 9/11)

Early 2000: Several sources tell FBI that Alwaki “had closed-door meetings in San Diego” with Alhazmi, al-Midhar and another unidentified person “whom al-Bayoumi had asked to help the hijackers.” (Congressional Joint Inquiry)

Feb. 3, 2000: FBI electronic communication, background searches re: Awlaki. (9/11 Commission report)

March 2000:  FBI closes its investigation, stating “the imam … does not meet the criterion for [further] investigation.” (Congressional Joint Inquiry on 9/11)

July-August 2000: Resigns from San Diego mosque.

Summer-Fall 2000: Travels abroad to “various countries.” (SD Union-Tribune 10/1/01)

January 2001: Moves to Virginia. Employed at Dar Al-Hijra Islamic Center in Falls Church, Va., largest mosque in the country.

January 2001: Enrolls in George Washington University’s Graduate School of Education and Human Development, pursing a Ph.D in human resource development.

Unknown: Meets Nidal Hasan, future Fort Hood shooter.

Early 2001: Named Muslim chaplain at GWU.

April 2001: Al-Hazmi and Hani Hanjour arrive in Falls Church and attend Dar Al-Hijra mosque. Awlaki denies having contact with the men in Virginia. (9/11 Commission report)

Before Sept. 11, 2001: Awlaki returns briefly to San Diego (9/11 Commission MFR) “Reportedly acted suspiciously by declining help with boxes he was transporting in a rental car (driven only 37 miles) and by refusing to provide any local address to the rental agent.” (9/11 Commission MFR FBI Agent #59)

Sept. 17, 2001:  In comments published on IslamOnline, Alawki suggested that Israelis may have been responsible for the 9/11 attacks and that the FBI “went into the roster of the airplanes and whoever has a Muslim or Arab name became the hijacker by default.”

Sept. 15-19, 2001: Interviewed four times by FBI.  Awlaki says he did not recognize Hazmi’s name but identifies his picture. Admitted meeting with Hazmi several times, he claimed not to remember any specifics of what they discussed. Describes Hazmi as a soft-spoken Saudi student who used to appear at the mosque with a companion but who did not have a large circle of friends. Does not identify Almihdhar.

September-November 2001: Interviewed numerous times by reporters, including National Geographic,  Ray Suarez and The Washington Post. 

2001-2002: Awlaki observed allegedly taking Washington-area prostitutes into Virginia. Authorities contemplate charging him under the Mann Act, reserved for nabbing pimps who transport prostitutes across state lines.

March 2002: Awlaki leaves for U.K.

March 31, 2002:  Lectures at Quran Expo in London

April 2002: Employment with Dar Al-Hijra mosque ends.

2002: Federal prosecutors in Colorado receive information from Ray Fournier, a federal diplomatic security agent in San Diego who was investigating Awlaki for passport fraud.

June 2002: Figures in Operation Green Quest, a terrorism-related money-laundering investigation.

Mid-2002: Radwan Abu-Issa, the subject of a Houston Joint Terrorism Task Force investigation, sends money to Awlaki, according to a document in a restricted government database. Awlaki’s name was placed on an early version of what is now the federal terror watch list.

June 17, 2002: Federal magistrate in Colorado signs warrant for Awlaki’s arrest for passport fraud.

October 2002: A federal diplomatic special agent in Colorado began investigating in preparation to take the case to a grand jury learns Awlaki corrected the place of birth on his Social Security application to New Mexico.

Oct. 8, 2002: FBI electronic communication, interview re: Awlaki. (9/11 Commission Report)

Oct. 9, 2002: Arrest warrant rescinded.

Oct. 10, 2002: Arrives in New York on a Saudi Airlines flight from Riyadh. Briefly detained by INS.

Oct. 11, 2002: Criminal case terminated.

Late 2002: Visits Fairfax, Virginia home of Ali al-Timimi, a radical cleric, and asked him about recruiting young Muslims for “violent jihad.” Al-Timimi, is now serving a life sentence for inciting followers to fight with the Taliban against Americans.

Late 2002: Departs U.S. for London.

June 2003: Delivers lecture at Muslim Association of Britain symposium in London

December 2003: Islamic Forum of Europe lecture: “Stop police terror.”

Dec. 18, 2003: British MP Louise Ellman tells House of Commons calls Muslim Association of Britain is a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood; says Awlaki “is reportedly wanted for questioning by the FBI in connection with the 9/11 al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on New York and Washington.”

Early 2004: Moves to Yemen.

2004: Lectures at Imam University in Sana’a, Yemen, a school headed by Abdul Majeed al-Zindani.

Mid-2006: Awlaki arrested in Yemen. Claims he was held at the request of the U.S. government.

Oct. 17, 2006: Yemeni secret police raid swept up eight foreigners living in Sana’a, under surveillance by the CIA and British intelligence, and at least 12 other men across Yemen. Yemeni authorities insist they dismantled an al-Qa’ida cell and disrupted a gun-running ring to neighbouring Somalia, although no evidence is found. Awlaki (identified as “Abu Atiq”) said to be key to the raid.

September 2007: FBI agents interview Awlaki in prison. Ask about contacts with 9/11 hijackers.

December 2007: Awlaki released after 18 months confinement in Yemen, almost all of it in solitary confinement.

February 2008: Registers www.anwar-alawlaki.com

February 2008: U.S. counterterrorism officials link Awlaki to terrorism, The Washington Post reports. “There is good reason to believe Anwar Aulaqi has been involved in very serious terrorist activities since leaving the United States, including plotting attacks against America and our allies,” an anonymous U.S. counterterrorism official tells the Post.

Unknown: Awlaki leaves Sana’a and moves to remote Shabwa region.

Dec. 17, 2008: Maj. Nidal Hasan contacts Awlaki via e-mail. “Do you remember me? I used to pray with you at the Virginia mosque.” Awlaki tells Al-Jazeera: “He was asking about killing American soldiers and officers. [He asked] whether this is a religiously legitimate act or not.”

“…the first message was asking for an edict regarding the [possibility] of a Muslim soldier killing his colleagues who serve with him in the American army. In other messages, Nidal was clarifying his position regarding the killing of Israeli civilians. He was in support of this, and in his messages he mentioned the religious justifications for targeting the Jews with missiles. Then there were some messages in which he asked for a way through which he could transfer some funds to us [and by this] participate in charitable activities.”

December 2008: San Diego JTTF opens investigation into intercepted e-mails between Awlaki and Maj. Nidal Hasan. (FBI statement)

Jan. 1, 2009: Awlaki speaks via satellite link  at London Muslim Centre. Event organized by Noor Pro Media.

January 2009: In blog post, Awlaki asks: “Today the world turns upside down when one Muslim performs a martyrdom operation. Can you imagine what would happen if that is done by seven hundred Muslims on the same day?!”

February 2009: Awlaki blog post, “I pray that Allah destroys America and all its allies and the day that happens, and I assure you it will and sooner than you think, I will be very pleased.”

Early 2009: E-mail contacts continue between Awlaki and Hassan. FBI San Diego forwards two messages to Washington Field Office. Later e-mail described as “more serious” not shared.

July 2009: Awlaki praises insurgent attack on Yemeni troops in Marib.

Aug. 4: Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, Nigerian suspected of trying to blow up Northwest Airlines Flight 253, attends Sana’a Institute for the Arabic Language,  according to the Yemeni Foreign Ministry.

August: The U.S. National Security Agency intercepts al-Qaida conversations about an unidentified “Nigerian.”

Sept. 21: Abdulmutallab leaves Sana’a Institute.

Fall: NSA intercepts “voice-to-voice communication” between Abdulmutallab and Awlaki indicating that Aulaqi “was in some way involved in facilitating this guy’s transportation or trip through Yemen.”

October: Abdulmutallab travels to Shabwa province. The 23-year-old engineering graduate probably met with al-Qaeda operatives in a house built by Awlaki.

Fall: Yemeni Foreign Minister Rashad Alimi states Abdulmutallab meets Awlaki at a remote meeting place in Shabwa province. Abdulmutallab tells FBI that Alwaki personally blessed attack.

Nov. 5, 2009: Hasan allegedly kills 13 at Fort Hood.

Nov. 7, 2009: Post on Awlaki’s website praises Hasan as a “hero.”

Dec. 7, 2009: Abdulmutallab leaves Yemen for Ethiopia.

Dec. 23, 2009: Al-Jazeera broadcasts interview with Awlaki.

Dec. 24, 2009: Awlaki falsely reported as killed in Yemeni airstrike. The strike by Yemeni air forces targeted a meeting attended by Nasir al-Whaishi and (former Guantanamo detainee) Said al-Shiri at a hideout of al-Qaida in the Rafdh area of the al-Said districts in Shabwa governorate Yemen. U.S. and Saudi intelligence reportedly provide assistance.

Dec. 25, 2009: Rep. Pete Hoekstra, senior Republican on House Intelligence Committee, suggests there may be a link between Awlaki and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.

Dec. 29, 2009: Alwaki became “operational” sometime over past year, senior U.S. official tells Fox News.

Jan. 3, 2010: “Mr. Awlaki is a problem. He’s clearly a part of Al Qaida in Arabian Peninsula. He’s not just a cleric. He is in fact trying to instigate terrorism,” said John Brennan, deputy national security advisor for counterterrorism and homeland security.

Jan. 14: Ali Mohamed Al Anisi, the director of Yemen’s National Security Agency and a senior presidential adviser, said talks were under way with members of Mr. Awlaki’s tribe in an effort to convince the cleric to turn himself in.

Pakistani President Ali Zadari on Money Laundering

December 13, 2009, by Seth Hettena. 0 Comments

The International News in Pakistan reports today that President Asif Ali Zardari says he was cleared in a 10-year-old money laundering investigation by the US Congress.

The Presidency has officially claimed that the US Congressional Subcommittee on Money Laundering had cleared Asif Ali Zardari, as it had found no evidence that Citibank or any other private bank knowingly helped Mr Salinas (of Mexico), or any other criminals launder dirty money.

This official statement has been released by the spokesman of the president Farhatullah Babar in response to questions sent to him about the details provided by the Citibank’s top administration to the US Subcommittee on Money Laundering in November 1999.

This comes as a Pakistani anti-corruption agency found that Zardari had accumulated assets of $1.5 billion through illegal means. Zardari, who was known as “Mr. 10 percent,” is the notoriously corrupt widow of the late former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.

An investigation in 1999 by the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations into private banking and money laundering examined that Zardari had three accounts at Citibank Switzerland private bank. Some of the accounts allegedly were used to disguise $10 million in kickbacks for a gold importing contract to Pakistan.

Another of Citibank Switzerland’s high profile clients was Raul Salinas, the infamous brother of former Mexican President Carlos Salinas.

Swiss authorities froze more than  $100 million – allegedly linked to drug trafficking — in Salinas’ accounts. That included  about $27 million Citibank Switzerland private bank.

The Senate subcommittee notes a striking coincidence between the two men: “The Zardari accounts in Switzerland were opened one day before Raul Salinas was arrested.”

Zardari’s accounts were opened February 27, 1995. Salinas was arrested and imprisoned in Mexico on suspicion of murder the following day.

According to the Senate subcommittee report:

On the day following the arrest, a number of telephone conversations took place between private bank personnel in New York, London and Switzerland. The telephone conversations to London were recorded on an automatic taping system. The tape transcripts indicate that the private bank’s initial reaction to the arrest was not to assist law enforcement, but to determine whether the Salinas accounts should be moved to Switzerland to make discovery of the assets and bank records more difficult. This suggestion was made by the head of the private bank at the time, Hubertus Rukavina, and discussed by several employees. It was not acted upon, apparently because it was agreed that London bank records would disclose the funds transfer to Switzerland. Private bank employees also tried to determine whether to require immediate repayment of an outstanding $3 million loan that had been made to Trocca (a Salinas family trust), so that if the funds in the Trocca accounts were frozen by authorities, Citibank funds would not be at risk.

Rukavina also played a role in the Zardari accounts. Specifically, he was involved in the decision to allow a Swiss lawyer to open three accounts on behalf of Zardari.

Rukavina told the Senate subcommittee staff that he did not make the decision to open the accounts but referred the matter to the head of private bank operations in Pakistan, Deepak Sharma.  According to Mr. Rukavina, he never heard whether the accounts were ultimately opened.

A Swiss judge found in 2003 that Zardari was guilty of money laundering, and a Swiss prosecutor closed the investigation last year, saying there wasn’t enough evidence to bring Zardari to trial.